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BOOK REVIEW
The Battle for Mozambique: The Frelimo-Renamo Struggle, 1977–1992, edited 
by Stephen A. Emerson, Pinetown, South Africa: 30° South,  2013, 240 pp.
This is, above all, a book of military history which – like the classic ‘curate’s egg’ – is ‘good in 
parts’. The book addresses the 16-year war between the Frente de Libertação de Moçambique 
(FRELIMO) government and the MNR/Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (RENAMO)1 insur-
gents: the role of individual leaders, the operational strategy of FRELIMO and RENAMO com-
manders in the field, the battles they fought, and the lives of their troops. Emerson charts the 
interaction between domestic and regional decolonisation struggles in Mozambique, Rhodesia/
Zimbabwe, and South Africa, underlining the important dynamics between liberation strug-
gles and white resistance, insurgency/counter-insurgency.2 In doing so, the author looks at the 
original emergence of MNR/RENAMO into a self-sufficient force. The Cold War backdrop is 
identified as a crucial part of this narrative, and its conclusion as a key enabler of the Rome 
peace negotiations in 1992. However, Emerson firmly believes that opportunities were missed 
to end the war before this.
Given the relatively benign international environment of détente between the superpowers in 
the 1970s, the Cold War as a battle of systems and ideas permeated Mozambique from different 
sources and in different ways. From 1977 to 1980, the Carter Administration adopted a highly 
deliberate ‘hands-off ’ approach to Mozambique, whilst ideas of African Marxist developmental 
models enjoyed a relatively supportive intellectual climate amongst the European Left in the 
1970s. The needs of the new government were indeed acute. The Machel government was the 
beneficiary of international aid and assistance – the Labour Government of James Callaghan in 
London channelled developmental assistance and technical training for the newly independent 
state through the Commonwealth Fund for Technical Cooperation – as well as Soviet and East 
European (principally from the GDR) military training and logistical assistance. In contrast, 
motivated by their own strategic calculations and Cold War perceptions, the Rhodesian Central 
Intelligence Organisation exploited disparate social and economic tensions within newly inde-
pendent Mozambique, prompted by FRELIMO’s radical agrarian programme and adminis-
trative reorganisation. The author explores the responsibility of the Salisbury government for 
the training, equipment and deployment of the nascent MNR/RENAMO forces, FRELIMO’s 
increasingly aggressive response, and the impact of the spiralling violence upon the Mozambique 
rural population. Again, the brutality of the struggle for capture of the post-colonial state, which 
appeared only occasionally in the newspapers, took insurgency and government response to new 
depths. In a story which is too familiar in today’s accounts of insurgencies across the African 
continent, the civilian rural population was caught in the crossfire, child soldiers were forcibly 
recruited into both government and insurgent forces, rape was used as a weapon of war, as were 
extreme acts of terror to intimidate and control. Approximately one million Mozambicans died 
in this 16-year war, while the violence internally displaced vast numbers and drove millions of 
Mozambicans into exile.
Based on extensive personal interviews with surviving combatants in the Mozambican theatre, 
memoir literature, and published secondary sources, Emerson charts this slide of violence as a 
political language and the crucial input of external actors and finance. Ending the three-sided 
1 resistência Nacional Moçambicana/Mozambique National resistance (renamo, Mozambique National resistance). 
2 see david Martin and Phyllis Johnson, The Struggle for Zimbabwe: The Chimurenga War (london and Boston: Faber & 
Faber, 1981).
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civil war in Rhodesia/Zimbabwe in 1979 assumed an existential importance to the Machel gov-
ernment. (In October 1979 alone, the Rhodesian security forces’ raid on Mozambican infrastruc-
ture caused over $11m of damage, and Emerson highlights the extent to which the Rhodesian 
security forces were actively prosecuting the external war throughout the Lancaster House 
negotiations in London in late 1979). Machel hoped that the ending of the war in Rhodesia would 
spell the end of the MNR insurgency. Whilst the FRELIMO government had backed Robert 
Mugabe’s ZANU/ZANLA faction within the Patriotic Front going into negotiations in London 
in the September, it was Machel’s message to Mugabe that failure to accept the Lancaster House 
settlement in December would result in the withdrawal of Mozambique’s support for rear bases 
and training camps. This clinched the ZANU leader’s decision to sign.
Machel’s hopes of the end of the war in Rhodesia meaning domestic peace in Mozambique 
were dashed. With the internationally recognised independence of Zimbabwe in April 1980, 
South Africa took over responsibility for finance and training of MNR/RENAMO and organ-
ised the removal of fighters and their equipment from their base at Odzi to the north eastern 
Transvaal. The dramatic expansion of South African military assistance ensured the growth and 
reach of the insurgency, as the civil war in Mozambique therefore was drawn more firmly into 
the Pretoria government’s counter-insurgency strategy and associated regional destabilisation. 
The South African government and its security forces were determined to ensure that the ANC 
and its armed wing, MK, did not acquire forward bases. (Indeed, the South African military’s 
continued covert assistance to RENAMO was the principal reason for the breakdown of the 
Nkomati Accord of 1984 – which ran directly counter to the regional policies being pursued by 
the South African Department of Foreign Affairs.) The Cold War permeated this regional strug-
gle, although the perceptions and outlook of the PW Botha government were far from identical 
to those of the Reagan and Thatcher administrations. The enduring ideological connections and 
alignments between National Liberation Movements as parties of government are underlined 
as the ZANU-PF leader President Mugabe sent in Zimbabwean troops to assist FRELIMO in 
defending infrastructure, key road and rail transport routs. These troops bore an increasingly 
heavy burden of the fighting and many of the black members of the former Rhodesian security 
forces, now integrated into the Zimbabwean National Army, lost their lives in the ongoing war.
Emerson closely follows the interplay of these actors, as well as noting the incoming Reagan 
Administration’s and Congress’ markedly differing views of the FRELIMO government and the 
ideological attractions of their RENAMO opponents. (Documents available in the Margaret 
Thatcher Foundation archives bear out the consistent message from the British government of 
the undesirability of supporting RENAMO.) President Reagan’s own diary, edited by Donald 
Brinkley, includes a telling reflection on Machel’s visit to Washington in September 1987: 
(‘Turned out to be quite a guy & I believe he really intends to be “non-aligned” instead of a 
Soviet patsy. We got along fine.’3 Reagan recognised Machel to be an African nationalist, rather 
than a Marxist, but that it would be hard to convince people on Capitol Hill of this.) As the war 
ground on in the late 1980s, FRELIMO forces adopted an increasingly defensive posture which 
left the strategic initiative to RENAMO.
The book focuses primarily on the military dynamic between the FRELIMO forces and 
their MNR/RENAMO opponents, and the author has taken considerable care to fill in the gaps 
and to cross-reference and triangulate the veracity of statements. Emerson’s long interest and 
engagement with Mozambique is evident. However, the book comes across as having been 
written from a relatively narrow American Anglo-phone perspective. It is importantly limited 
in its range of secondary sources, the handling of the primary material, and the scope of the 
analysis, and incomplete and imperfect in its citation of its primary material and interviews. 
Its declared purpose is to get ‘the facts’ straight in the struggle between the newly independent 
3 douglas Brinkley, ed., The Reagan Diaries (New york: HarperCollins, 2007), 354.
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FRELIMO government and the growing insurgency of MNR/RENAMO between 1977 and 1992. 
At the start, Emerson states firmly that the war in Mozambique is one of the most overlooked of 
the region’s struggles in the Cold War. It is certainly true that the liberation struggle and white 
minority resistance in neighbouring Rhodesia have attracted a wide literary outpouring, from 
the ‘Rhodesiana’ of memoir literature from former white members of the Rhodesian security 
forces (Timothy Stapleton’s African Soldiers and Policemen in Colonial Zimbabwe 1923–1980 
is a welcome study of the black Zimbabwean majority within the Rhodesian security forces), 
to academic studies on liberation combatants and most recently the struggle over ideas of the 
Rhodesian state.4 Similarly, the struggle to end apartheid in neighbouring South Africa has pro-
duced a rich field of study from diverse domestic and international perspectives; and the long war 
in Portugal’s colony of Angola continues to attract serious study and publication (for example, 
Justin Pearce’s excellent Political Identity and Conflict in Central Angola 1975–2002).5 In com-
parison, the complex impact of the Cold War struggle on Mozambique and the dynamics of the 
war itself have indeed been relatively ignored, but there are important works in English (which 
the author himself cites),6 Portuguese, and French. Similarly, the author’s declared purpose to 
‘set the record straight’ fails to identify where he deems that narrative to be distorted, partial, 
imperfect, and downright flawed. Emerson has conducted an impressive range of interviews 
with surviving RENAMO combatants and former FRELIMO soldiers, but the identification of 
these interviewees is highly varied. Similarly, he has sourced hitherto inaccessible documents 
from the Rhodesian military intelligence – again, there is no indication of the location of these 
archives – as well as US documents which would appear to be in his possession. The analysis 
offered in this book would have been immeasurably strengthened by drawing on a much wider 
range of multi-lingual archives and sources and by expanding its interpretive framework to 
include the Mozambican rural population’s view of and engagement with the struggle, which 
shaped self-interest and political loyalty. Similarly, it contains a number of factual errors (such as 
the date of Zimbabwean independence) which would have been easily corrected with a careful 
copy-edit. Overall, therefore this is an interesting book of military history, which is well written 
and accessible and which certainly adds to our overall knowledge. But it is not the definitive 
account of the struggle in Mozambique.
Sue Onslow
Institute of Commonwealth Studies, 
University of London, School of Advanced Studies
 sue.onslow@sas.ac.uk
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4 timothy stapleton, African Soldiers and Policemen in Colonial Zimbabwe 1923–1980 (rochester: University of rochester 
Press, 2011); luise White: Unpopular Sovereignty: Rhodesian Independence and African Decolonisation (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2015).
5 Justin Pearce, Political Identity and Conflict in Central Angola 1975–2002 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015).
6 Maylin Newitt, A History of Mozambique (london: Hurst, 1995); alex Vine, RENAMO: From Terrorism to Democracy in 
Mozambique (york: Centre for southern african studies, University of york, and Eduardo Mondlane Foundation, amsterdam, 
1996); Joe Hanlon, Revolution Under Fire (london: Zed Books, 1984); Beggar Your Neighbors: Apartheid Power in Southern 
Africa (oxford: Catholic institute for race relations in collaboration with James Currey Publishers, 1986); Paul Moorcraft, 
Inside the Danger Zones. Travelling to Arresting Places (Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball Publishers, 2011).
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